Does the Second Circuit’s Motive-Based Test Apply to Connecticut Religious Accommodation Law?

My colleagues and I published a detailed breakdown this week over on the Employment Law Letter of the Second Circuit’s new framework for religious accommodation claims under Title VII. The short version: the court has replaced the familiar “notice plus adverse action” prima facie test with a motive-based inquiry drawn from the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

The question, as posed by the court, isn’t what the employer knew. It is whether the employer’s desire to avoid providing a religious accommodation was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision.

If you handle accommodation requests in Connecticut or New York, go read that post for the full doctrinal breakdown.

What I want to address here is the Connecticut-specific piece, because I’ve already heard the followup question: Does this new framework apply to state law claims under CFEPA?

The Connecticut Question

The honest answer is: we do not know yet.

CFEPA prohibits religious discrimination and requires reasonable accommodation absent undue hardship, similar to Title VII. On the undue hardship side, Connecticut is actually ahead of federal law. The state statute defines undue hardship as “significant difficulty or expense,” which aligns with the standard the Supreme Court adopted in Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023). Connecticut employers were already operating under a substantive undue hardship test before the rest of the country caught up.

But the Second Circuit’s new motive-based prima facie framework is a different animal. That is a procedural and analytical standard for how a plaintiff proves a failure-to-accommodate claim in the first place, separate from the undue hardship defense. Connecticut courts often look to federal Title VII case law for guidance when interpreting CFEPA. They do not, however, automatically adopt every federal framework.

No Connecticut appellate court has addressed whether the Abercrombie-derived motive test applies to CFEPA claims. The CHRO has not issued guidance on this point. And the Connecticut Supreme Court has historically been willing to interpret CFEPA independently when it believes a different approach serves Connecticut’s broader remedial purposes.

So if you are a Connecticut employer, you cannot simply map the Second Circuit’s new federal analysis onto your state law obligations and call it a day. You may face different burdens depending on whether the claim is brought under Title VII or CFEPA.

What a Defensible Accommodation Process Looks Like Right Now

Regardless of which prima facie test ultimately governs state claims, the practical guidance for employers is the same. The motive-based standard makes your internal process and documentation more important, not less.

When an employee requests a religious accommodation, engage in an interactive process. Document it as it happens, not after the fact. If you need more information about the sincerity of the belief, ask for it through proper channels. Do not let a request sit in someone’s inbox unanswered for three weeks.

If you are going to deny an accommodation, write down the reason before you communicate the denial. If the reason is undue hardship, spell out what the hardship is, specifically, in the context of your business. “It’s inconvenient” will not cut it after Groff, and it certainly will not survive under Connecticut’s “significant difficulty or expense” standard. If the reason is that you genuinely cannot determine whether the belief is sincerely held, say so explicitly and document what additional information you requested.

Consider alternatives. Under Groff, an employer that identifies hardship with one accommodation cannot simply stop there. You have to look at other options. If the employee cannot have Saturdays off entirely, can you rotate the schedule? Can you offer a partial accommodation? Courts are going to ask whether you tried.

The Bottom Line

Religious accommodation law is shifting under employers’ feet right now. The Groff decision raised the bar on undue hardship. The Second Circuit’s new decision has restructured how plaintiffs prove their claims in the first place. Connecticut law may or may not follow the same path, and we will not know until a state court weighs in.

In the meantime, the safe course for Connecticut employers is to build a process that would survive scrutiny under either standard. Document everything. Engage genuinely. And do not assume that a federal win at summary judgment translates to a state law win in the same case.

For the full breakdown of the Second Circuit’s new prima facie framework and what it means doctrinally, head over to the Employment Law Letter.