Second Circuit Rewrites the Playbook on Religious Accommodation Claims

Employers in Connecticut and New York who thought they had a solid handle on religious accommodation law just got a new wrinkle. Last week, the Second Circuit adopted a new prima facie standard for failure-to-accommodate-religion claims under Title VII. The decision vacates summary judgment for an employee who was terminated for refusing to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination requirement after her request for a religious exemption was denied. But the real significance lies in what the court did to the legal framework itself. The case, Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, No. 25-721, can be read here.

Jessica Bergin worked as a court officer for the New York State Unified Court System (UCS). In September 2021, UCS announced a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination requirement with a process for employees to seek religious or medical exemptions. Bergin submitted an exemption request citing her religious beliefs, including a personal statement, scripture verses, and a letter from her pastor. UCS’s Vaccine Exemption Review Committee asked Bergin to complete a supplemental questionnaire designed to explore the sincerity of her stated beliefs. Bergin returned the form largely unanswered. UCS denied her exemption, and when she failed to get vaccinated by the deadline, she was placed on leave and ultimately terminated in April 2022.

Bergin sued under Title VII, asserting a single claim of failure to accommodate her religion. The district court granted partial summary judgment in her favor, finding that UCS had effectively admitted that Bergin’s initial request was “perfectly adequate” and “explained a religious belief,” and that UCS failed to demonstrate undue hardship. The Second Circuit vacated that decision and remanded.

The New Standard: Motive Over Knowledge

The heart of the decision is the court’s holding that the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015), abrogated the Second Circuit’s longstanding prima facie test for religious accommodation claims. Under the old standard, a plaintiff needed to show: (1) a bona fide religious belief conflicting with a work requirement, (2) that she informed her employer of that belief, and (3) that she was disciplined for noncompliance.

The Second Circuit has now replaced that test. Going forward, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

1. That she actually required an accommodation of her religious practice; and
2. That the employer’s desire to avoid providing that accommodation was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.

This is a significant shift. The old test focused on what the employer knew. The new test focuses on what the employer wanted to avoid. In the court’s words, Title VII’s disparate treatment provision “prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” An employer who has actual knowledge of a religious conflict does not violate Title VII if avoiding accommodation was not its motive. Conversely, an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if it had no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that an accommodation would be needed.

So far, so good. But this is where things get complicated for employers. Traditional accommodation law, whether under the ADA or Title VII, is largely a process-based inquiry. The employer receives a request, engages in an interactive process, evaluates undue hardship, and provides or denies an accommodation. The focus has historically been on what the employer did and what it knew.

The Bergin decision layers a motive inquiry on top of that process for religious accommodations. The court is clear that knowledge of a religious conflict remains relevant as evidence of motive, but knowledge alone is no longer enough to satisfy the prima facie case, and lack of knowledge is no longer automatically fatal to the claim.

This creates friction with how employers have long understood their obligations. Under the old regime, an employer that never received adequate notice of a religious belief could reasonably conclude it had no accommodation obligation. Under Bergin, that same employer could still face liability if a factfinder concludes that avoiding a potential accommodation was a motivating factor in the adverse action.

The court also rejected the argument that Abercrombie was limited to hiring decisions, holding that Title VII “draws no distinctions between” hiring and firing. This means the motive standard applies across the full spectrum of adverse employment actions, including termination, suspension, and denial of exemption requests.

For practitioners familiar with the ADA, this represents a notable divergence. ADA failure-to-accommodate claims do not typically require a showing of discriminatory motive; the focus is on whether the employer provided a reasonable accommodation or demonstrated undue hardship. Title VII religious accommodation claims now require something more: proof that the employer’s desire to avoid accommodation was a motivating factor. This effectively adds a disparate-treatment overlay to what has traditionally been treated as a standalone accommodation obligation.

There was also a secondary issue that will carry more relevance to attorneys than to companies. The Second Circuit also reversed the district court’s finding that UCS made a judicial admission that Bergin’s initial application demonstrated a sincerely held religious belief. UCS had stated in discovery that Bergin’s request was “perfectly adequate” and “explained a religious belief,” but also repeatedly noted that additional information was needed to assess sincerity. The court held that these statements, viewed in context and in the light most favorable to UCS, did not constitute the kind of “intentional, clear, and unambiguous” admission required for judicial-admission treatment.

This is still an important reminder for employers: statements in discovery, including interrogatory responses and Rule 30(b)(6) testimony, can be taken out of context if not carefully worded. But they also will not automatically be treated as binding admissions if they are equivocal or part of a broader narrative.

Practical Takeaways for Connecticut and New York Employers

Revisit your accommodation request procedures. The motive standard means that what matters is not just whether you processed the request correctly, but whether your reason for denying or limiting the accommodation can withstand scrutiny. Employers should ensure that every denial is supported by a documented, legitimate, non-pretextual business rationale. If the reason for denial is genuine uncertainty about sincerity, say so clearly and follow up through proper channels.

Document motive, not just process. Under the old standard, documenting what the employee told you and what steps you took was usually sufficient. Now, employers should also document why they made the decisions they made at each step. If you denied an exemption because you genuinely could not determine sincerity without additional information, memorialize that reasoning contemporaneously. If the denial rested on undue hardship, make sure the hardship analysis is written down before the denial is communicated.

Tighten your interactive process protocols. The court left open the question of how an employee’s failure to challenge an employer’s exemption procedure might bear on a motive analysis. This ambiguity cuts both ways. Employers should make sure their process is reasonable and well-documented, but they should not assume that an employee’s failure to fully participate in the process automatically insulates them. Engage in good faith at every step, offer opportunities for the employee to supplement their request, and keep records of each exchange.

Account for state law. Connecticut’s Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) prohibits religious discrimination and requires reasonable accommodation absent undue hardship, similar to Title VII. However, CFEPA claims are adjudicated under state-law standards, and Connecticut courts have historically applied a “motivating factor” causation standard in discrimination cases. The New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) similarly prohibits religious discrimination and has been interpreted to provide broader protections than federal law in many contexts. Employers operating in both states should evaluate whether the Bergin motive standard narrows or aligns with existing state-law obligations and adjust policies accordingly. This will be a moving target in the months to come.

Review vaccination and other uniform-policy exemption frameworks. Although the immediate factual context involves a now-rescinded vaccine mandate, the legal principle extends to any workplace requirement from which employees may seek religious exemptions, including dress codes, scheduling requirements, grooming standards, and technology-use policies. Any denial of a religious exemption request is now potentially subject to a motive inquiry.

Bergin is only weeks old, and the Second Circuit’s motive-based framework will need to be worked out through further litigation. In the meantime, Connecticut and New York employers should consult employment counsel before denying a religious accommodation request, and should make sure that every step of the decision-making process, including the reasoning behind it, is documented as it happens.